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DISCRIMINATION LAW-TITLE IX AND SEX DISCRIMINATION
IN EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT-North Haven Board of Education
v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980).
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local government."l This statement, made by the United
States Supreme Court in 1954, still holds true almost three decades
later. In school buildings and on college campuses across the nation,
thousands of people exchange ideas, are instilled with values, and
prepare for entrance into American society. For the" American edu
cational system to carry on these functions in a manner that con
forms to this country's ideals, there must be equal treatment in the
educational system for every citizen regardless of race, creed, na
tional origin, or sex. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
(title IX)2 was enacted to promote equal treatment in education for
people of both sexes. Title IX sought to reduce, or stop, the expendi
ture of federal monies to educational programs or activities in which
sex discrimination occurred: "No person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . . "3
The Education Amendments of 1972 empower~d the Depart
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to promulgate regu
lations implementing title IX. 4 The final regulations were issued in
1975 and were controversial when released because, among other
things, they attempted to regulate sex discrimination in educational
employment. 5 This controversy was brought before the United
I. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. 20 U.S.c. §§ 1681-1686 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as title IX).
3. Id. at § 1681(a).
4. The responsibility for the promulgation of regulations under title IX has been
transferred from HEW to the newly created Department of Education, 20 U.S.c. § 3401;
3 C.F.R. Exec. Order No. 12212, (1980). The creation of the Department of Education
resulted in a change in references to the regulations issued under title IX. The Code of
Federal Regulations reference to the regulations as issued by HEW was 45 C.F.R.
§§ 86.51-.61 (1980). The identical regulations have been reissued by the Department of
Education as 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.51-106.61 (1980). The numbering used in this case note
will be those of the HEW regulations.
5. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61 (1980).
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in Romeo
Community Schools v. HEW (Romeo £).6 The issue was whether
HEW had authority under title IX to regulate the employment prac
tices of educational institutions by withholding federal funds that
were used by those institutions in a sexually discriminatory manner.
Within three years of Romeo I, thirteen separate courts confronted
this issue, and each of the thirteen courts decided that the regulations
exceeded the authority granted to HEW by title IX.7 On July 24,
1980, in North Haven Board of Education v. Hufstedler (North Ha
ven)8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit be
came the first court to hold the regulations valid. 9 This note will
explore the rationale for North Haven and will consider the possible
ramifications of the case.

II.

F ACTUAL

BACKGROUND

The North Haven branch of the case arose when Ms. Elaine
Dove, a former teacher in the North Haven school system, filed a
complaint with HEW alleging a violation of title IX based on the
school board's failure to rehire her following a maternity leave. lO
After an exchange of letters between HEW and the North Haven
6. 438 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977), ajf'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979).
7. See Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (6th Cir. 1979), ajf'g, 16 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 719, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 8241 (W.D. Wash. 1978), cert. granted, 449 U.S.
1009 (1980); Romeo Community Schools V. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979), ajf'g, 438
F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. V.
Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1979), ajf'g, 455 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Mo. 1978); Isles
boro School Comm. V. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir. 1979), ajf'g, 449 F. Supp. 866 (D.
Me. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Grove City College V. Harris, 500 F. Supp.
253 (W.D. Pa. 1980); North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. Califano, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
1505,20 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 30,198 (D. Conn. 1979), rev'd sub nom. North Haven Bd. of
Educ. V. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, cert. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. V.
Bell, 450 U.S. 909 (1981); Auburn School Dist. V. HEW, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1504,
20 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 30,146 (D.N.H. 1979); Board of Educ. V. HEW, 19 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 457, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 30,085 (N.D. Ohio 1979); University of Toledo V.
HEW, 464 F. Supp. 693 (N;D. Ohio 1979); Dougherty School Sys. V. Califano, 19 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 688 (M.D. Ga. 1978).
8. 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. V.
Bell, 450 U.S. 909 (1981). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
decided two separate appeals under the designation of North Haven Bd. of Educ. V.
Hufstedler. The appeals were taken in North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. Califano, 19 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1505,20 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 30,198 (D. Conn. 1979) and Trumbull Bd.
of Educ. V. HEW, No. 78-401 (D. Conn. Sept. 13, 1979) (unreported). The cases involved
are treated differently on factual points, but both involve the same legal issue. 629 F.2d
at 774.
9. 629 F.2d at 786.
10. North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. Califano, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1505, 1506 n.l,
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Board of Education, II the school board filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 12 assert
ing that the regulation 13 promulgated by HEW requiring that preg
nancy be treated as a temporary disability was beyond the authority
granted to the agency under title IX.14 Judge Ellen Bree Bums
granted summary judgment for the North Haven board based on
Romeo I, which held that the regulations l5 exceeded the intention of
Congress, were beyond the meaning of the statutory language, and
called for remedies that were too drastic and far-reaching. 16
The Trumbull branch of the case began when Ms. Linda Potz, a
former guidance counselor at a junior high school in Trumbull, Con
necticut, filed a complaint with HEWP An investigation conducted
by HEW concluded that: Ms. Potz was the only female guidance
counselor at the junior high school level in the Trumbull system; she
had been asked to falsify a title IX self-evaluation report; she had
been replaced by a male; and that she had been required to type
notices and run errands for the male principal. I8 HEW concluded
that the school board was motivated by Ms. Potz' gender when the
board made its decision not to renew her contract. 19
After its investigation, HEW ordered the Trumbull board to
take corrective action.20 The school board instead brought suit in
the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 21
contending that HEW lacked authority under title IX to promulgate
regulations concerning sex discrimination in educational employ
20 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 30,198, at 12061 n.1 (D. Conn. 1979) (Secretary Hufstedler was
substituted for former Secretary Califano).
II. Id. at 1506, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 12,062.
12. Id. at 1505, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 12,061.
13. 45 C.F.R. § 86.57(c) (1980).
14. Joint Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at I, North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. Huf
stedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), cerl. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. V.
Bell, 450 U.S. 909 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees).
15. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61 (1980).
16. North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. Califano, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1505, 1507-09,
20 Empl. Prac. Dec., ~ 30,198, at 12,062-64.
17. Brieffor Appellant Linda Potz at 4-7, North Haven V. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773
(2d Cir. 1980), cerl. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 450 U.S. 909
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant Linda Potz).
18. Id. at 6-7. None of these activities were required of her male colleagues. Id.
19. Id. at 7.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Trumbull Bd. of Educ. V. HEW, No. 78-401 (D. Conn. Sept. 13, 1979)
(unreported).
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ment. 22 Judge Bums granted a motion for summary judgment refer
ring to her previous decision in the North Haven branch of the case
in which she held that the regulations exceeded HEW's authority
under title IX.23 HEW and Ms. Potz appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 24
III.

ANALYSIS BY THE COURTS

The issue before the Second Circuit in North Haven was
whether HEW had authority under title IX to regulate the employ
ment practices of the North Haven and Trumbull boards of educa
tion. The inquiry commenced with an examination of the language
of the statute. 25
HEW argued that the term "no person" indicated a broad cate
gory of potential beneficiaries limited only by the language of the
statute. 26 The qualifications for a potential beneficiary are that the
person must "be excluded from participation in, be denied the bene
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational pro
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ."27 In
Romeo I, Judge John Feikens concluded that it was difficult to fit
teachers within these boundaries because teachers: Participate only
to the extent of teaching; benefit only to the extent of salaries; and
are subject to discrimination only to the extent that the programs
themselves may be established or operated in a discriminatory man
ner.28 In North Haven, the Second Circuit found that the language
of the statute was ambiguous as to whether teachers were included. 29
In support of its position, the Second Circuit pointed to similar con
fusion in Congress over a parallel section of Title VI of the Civil
22. Brief for Appellant Linda Potz at 5, supra note 17; Brief for PlaintiffS-Appellees
at 3, supra note 14.
23. 629 F.2d at 775; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 3-4, supra note 14.
24. 629 F.2d at 773.
25. Id. at 777. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756
(1975) . ("The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the lan
guage itself.")
26. Brief for Federal Appellants at 13-14, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler,
629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 450
U.S. 909 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Fed. Appellants).
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). There is potential confusion about the numbering
of the section of title IX at its various stages of development. During the congressional
debate, the proposal was designated title X and numbered accordingly. Finally, title IX
was codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976) and a third set of numbers was created.
28. 438 F. Supp. at 1031-32. See also Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593
F.2d 424, 426 (1st Cir. 1979).
29. 629 F.2d at 777-78.
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Rights Act of 1964 (title VI).30 Congress clarified title VI by amend
ing it to explicitly exclude employment from coverage. 31 Title IX
was not clarified in any corresponding manner. 32
Title IX also contained a series of exceptions or delays in imple
mentation for special institutions, organizations, or activities. 33
None of these exceptions precisely dealt with any aspect of employ
ment. The exceptions excluded whole classes of educational institu
tions,34 certain types of activities that might be undertaken at an
institution otherwise covered,35 and scholarships received as prizes in
beauty contests. 36 When Romeo Community Schools v. HEW (Ro
meo 1I)37 reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, the court decided that all the exceptions related exclusively
to students, student bodies, or participants in educational pro
grams. 38 It therefore "may be fairly assumed" that professional edu
cation employees were not covered by title IX. 39 The Second Circuit
disagreed with the Sixth Circuit and noted that the exceptions for
religious and military schools did not mention students at all, but
excluded entire institutions from coverage. 40 It concluded that the
exceptions were ambiguous. 41 Whether professional employees, in
addition to students, were to be protected against sex discrimination
under title IX was tmclear from the statutory language. 42
30. Id. at 77S; see notes 95-9S infra and accompanying text.

31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976); 110 CONGo REC. 11930 (1964); see Kuhn, Title LY:
Employment andAthletics Are Outside HEW's Jurisdiction, 65 GEO. L.l. 49, 53-54 (1976).
32. CONF. REP. No. 79S, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 221, reprinted in (1972) U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 260S, 2671-72.
33. Exceptions to 20 U.S.c. § 16SI(a) (1976) are: (I) Classes of educational insti
tutions subject to prohibition; (2) educational institutions commencing planned change
in admissions; (3) educational institutions of religious organizations with contrary reli
gious tenets; (4) educational institutions training individuals for military services or
merchant marine; (5) public educational institutions with traditional and continuing ad
missions policies admitting only one sex; (6) social fraternities or sororities, voluntary
youth service organizations; (7) boy or girl conferences; (S) father-son or mother-daugh
ter activities at educational institutions; and (9) scholarship awards from "beauty" pag
eants that facilitate attendance at institutions of higher education. Id. § 16SI(a)(1)-(9).
34. Id. § 16SI(a)(2)-(5).
35. Id. § 16SI(a)(6)-(S).
36. Id. § 16SI(a)(9).
37. 600 F.2d 5S1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
3S. Id. at 584.
39. Id. See also liS CONGo REC. 5S12 (1972) (comment of Senator Bayh, "In the
area of employment, we permit no exceptions.").
40. 629 F.2d at 77S.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE IX

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit con
cluded that the language of title IX was unclear regarding Congress'
intention to cover professional education employees. The court then
considered the legislative history in its attempt to decipher the legis
lative purpose of title IX.43 The legislative history can be divided
into four parts. This note first considers proposals similar to title IX
that were offered in Congress prior to title IX, but either were with
drawn or were not approved. Second, the debate of title IX itself is
considered. Third, the reports of the House, Senate, and Conference
Committees are examined. Finally, the amendments and the pro
posed amendments to title IX that were offered after the law was
passed will be reviewed.
A.

Proposals Offered Prior To Tille IX

Prior to the consideration of the bill that later became title IX,
Senator Birch Bayh offered a bill in 1971 44 that clearly was described
as covering employment. 45 Senator George McGovern indicated
that rather than introduce a bill of his own dealing with sex discrimi
nation, he would support Senator Bayh's bill. 46 When announcing
the retraction of his proposal, Senator McGovern adverted to statis
tics indicating the low national percentage of female college profes
sors in order to demonstrate a problem he hoped Senator Bayh's bill
would rectify.47 In the House of Representatives, Representative
Edith Green submitted an amendment to insert the word "sex" after
"race, religion, and national origin" in title VI.48 None of these bills
were enacted,49 but they indicate congressional awareness of the
need to deal with the problem of sex discrimination in education. In
43. Id. at 778-83; see 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
184-90 (4th ed. 1973); Buek & Orleans, Sex Discrimination - A Bar to A Democratic Edu
calion: Overview of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 6 CONN. L. REV. 1
(1973).
44. 117 CONGo REC. 30155-56 (1971).
45. Id.
Id.
47. 1d.
48. Id.
46.

at 30411.

at 9822. The process of amending title VI by the introduction of "sex"
where appropriate was dropped because under Senate rules the whole of title VI might
have been opened for amendment.. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 135(a), 60
Stat. 812, 832 (1946) (current version codified at 2 U.S.c. § 190c (1976».
49. Senator Bayh's bill was dropped as nongermane. 117 CONGo REC. 30412-15
(1971). Senator McGovern supported Senator Bayh's bill rather than introduce a propo
sal of his own. 1d. at 30411. Congresswoman Green's bill was withdrawn. H.R. REP.
No. 16098, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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addition, at least two sponsors characterized sex discrimination in
educational employment as a portion of the larger problem of sex
discrimination in all professions. 50
In 1972, Senator Bayh introduced an amendment5) that was to
become title IX. 52 Senator Bayh said that his amendment was
"broad" and would close loopholes in previous legislation relating to
educational programs and employment. 53 He pointed to "admis
sions procedures, scholarships, and faculty employment" as being
covered by the amendment. 54
In Romeo I, Judge Feikens referred to only this passage from
the d~bate on title IX in his analysis of the legislative history. 55 He
concluded that, since the comments applied to all of Senator Bayh's
amendment, including the amendments to Title VII of the Equal
Rights Act of 1964 (title VII)56 and the Equal Pay for Professional
Women Act (Equal Pay Act),57 the employment references were to
those amendments and not to title IX. 58

B. Senate Debate On Title IX
The quantity of congressional debate considered relevant by the
judiciary increased in later cases. Where Judge Feikens had consid
ered only one passage of the Bayh debate in Romeo I, three passages
from the same debate were examined by the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit when the court delivered its decision in
Islesboro School Committee v. Califano .59 The passages are: First, a
dialogue between Senators Bayh and Claiborne Pell; second, a state
50. 117 CONGo REC. 13546-62, 30411 (1971).
51. 118 CONGo REC. 5802-03 (1972).
52. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1976); 42 U.S.c. § 2000e (1976). See also Brief for
Fed. Appellants at 24, supra note 26.
53. 118 CONGo REC. 5803 (1972). Senator Bayh said,
Amendment No. 874 is broad, but basically it closes loopholes in existing
legislation relating to general education programs and employment resulting
from those programs. . . . [T)he heart of this amendment is a provision ban
ning sex discrimination in educational programs receiving Federal funds. The
amendment would cover such crucial aspects as admissions procedures, schol
arships, and/aculty employment, with limited exceptions. . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. 438 F. Supp. at 1030.
56. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e
57. § 2000e-16 (1976).
58. 438 F. Supp. at 1030.
59. 593 F.2d 424, 426-28 (1st Cir. 1979), affg, 449 F. Supp. 866 (D. Me. 1978), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979) (The First Circuit invalidated HEW's regulation under title
IX of the school board's maternity leave policy.)
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ment by Senator Bayh correlating the employment sections of his
bill with the amendments to title VII and the Equal Pay Act; and
third, a summary of the bill that Senator Bayh read into the record. 60
The dialogue between Senators Pell and Bayh was quoted by
the First Circuit as follows:
Mr. Pell: . . . Sections 1011 [sic] (a) and (b) [these sections, in
large measure, became 20 U.S.C. § l68l(a) and (c)] include all ed
ucational institutions which receive Federal Assistance. This in
cludes elementary and secondary schools as well. With regard to
private undergraduate colleges, the Senator has excluded from
coverage their admissions practices. Does this same exclusion ap
ply to nonpublic institutions at the elementary and secondary
level?
Mr. Bayh: At the elementary and secondary levels, admis
sions policies are not covered. As the Senator knows, we are deal
ing with three basically different types of discrimination here. We
are dealing with discrimination in admission to an institution, dis
crimination of available services or studies within an institution
once students are admitted, and discrimination in employment
within an institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever.
In the area of employment, we permit no exceptions. In the
area of services, once a student is accepted within an institution,
we permit no exceptions. The Senator from Rhode Island asked
about admissions policies of private secondary and primary
schools. They would be excepted. 61

The court concluded that a reading of the passage in context
would not support HEW's conclusion that the dialogue showed con
gressional intention that title IX cover employment. 62 The court
noted: "While Senator Bayh's response was more extended than it
needed to be for a direct answer to Senator Pell's question, we think
HEW's reading is strained."63
The Islesboro court next considered a part of Senator Bayh's
comments in which he said that the second major portion of his
amendment would expand the coverage of title VII and the Equal
Pay Act to those "who 'perform work connected with the educa
60. Id. at 427-28. The passage upon which Judge Feikens relied was not men
tioned in Islesboro. The court noted occasional lapses in the debate where some senators
appeared to suggest that title IX covered employment. Id. at 428.
61. Id. at 427 (quoting 118 CONGo REc. 5812 (1972) (dialogue of Senator 8ayh &
Senator Pell».
62. Id.
63. Id.
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tional activities' of the institution."64 The court believed this passage
reinforced the idea that Senator Bayh linked employment with his
amendments to title VII and to the Equal Pay Act, while he linked
title IX to students. 6s
The third portion of the debate considered by the court was a
summary of Senator Bayh's amendment as put in the record. 66 This
summary, the First Circuit contended, included, inter alia, four parts:
First, Basic Prohibition; second, Enforcement and Related Provi
sions; third, Employment; and finally, Equal Pay for Professional
Women.67 The employment section referred to the amendments to
title VII68 and the Equal Pay Act. 69 The court concluded that this
division demonstrated that title IX was concerned with admissions
and services, while the amendments to title VII and the Equal Pay
Act dealt with employment. 7o
Two of the three passages noted by the First Circuit in Islesboro
reappeared in the briefs7l submitted to the Second Circuit. 72 The
North Haven and Trumbull school boards used Senator Bayh's sum
mary in a broader fashion than did the court in Islesboro. The
school boards looked not only at the concise, section-by-section sum
mary, but also at the summary given in Senator Bayh's own words. 73
They argued that Part A, "Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Fed
erally Funded Education Programs,"74 dealt with discrimination
against "beneficiaries" under title IX. 7S Plaintiffs believed that Part
B, "Prohibition of Education-Related Employment Discrimina
tion,"76 referred to the amendments to title VII and the Equal Pay
64. Id. at 428.
65.

66.
67.

/d.

118 CONGo REc. 5806-08 (1972).
593 F.2d at 428.
68. Id.
69. Id. See also Romeo Community Schools V. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 585 (6th Cir.),
cerr. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
70. 593 F.2d at 428.
71. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 18-20, supra note 14; Reply Brief for Federal
Appellants at 2; North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. Bell, 450 U.S. 909 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Fed. Appellants).
72. The passage purporting to show Senator Bayh's linking of employment with
title VII and the Equal Pay Act does not reappear. See notes 62-63 supra and accompa
nying text.
73. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 19, supra note 14; see 118 CONGo REC. 5807-08
(1972).
74. Brief for PlaintiffS-Appellees at 19, supra note 14.
75. Id. at 18.
76. Id. at 19.
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Act. 77 In its reply brief, HEW noted that a passage appeared in Part
A (which the school board contended applied to title IX) that explic
itly· referred to "employment practices for faculty and administra
tors."78 In North Haven, the Second Circuit remarked on the
significance of this passage in its analysis of the case. 79
The dialogue between Senators Pell and Bayh80 was utilized by
HEW in its brief submitted to the Second Circuit. 8l The Second Cir
cuit critically reviewed the debate, considered both the initial ex
change and the questions following, and concluded that the dialogue
indicated a link between title IX and employment.82
The dialogue specifically focused on the part of Senator Bayh's
amendment that became title IX. 83 Employment was mentioned ex
plicitly as an area to be covered by the amendment. 84 The discus
sion did not stop there. Senator Pell followed up with a series of
questions that directly related to specific exceptions to title IX. 85 The
Second Circuit considered the followup questions asked by Senator
Pell and Senator Bayh's responses to them in its analysis. The court
concluded that the entire dialogue was so closely related to the ex
77. Id. at 18.
78. Reply Brief for Fed. Appellants at 2, supra note 71. The portion of Senator
Bayh's summary omitted by plaintiffs-appellees reads as follows:
This portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all areas where abuse
has been mentioned---employmentpracticesforfaculty and administrators, schol
arship aid, admissions, access to programs within the institution such as voca
tional education classes, and so forth. The provisions have been tested under
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act for the last 8 years so that we have evi
dence of their effectiveness and flexibility.
118 CONGo REC. 5807 (1972) (emphasis added).
79. 629 F.2d at 780-81. See Dougherty School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. ./iled, 50 U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1980) (No. 80-1023).
80. 118 CONGo REC. 5812-13 (1972); see notes 84-85 infra and accompanying text.
81. Brief for Fed. Appellants at 27-28, supra note 26.
82. 629 F.2d at 782.
83. 118 CONGo REC. 5812-13 (1972).
84. Id.
85.
Mr. PELL: Thank you. Sections lOOI(a) and (b) include all educa
tional institutions which receive Federal assistance. This includes elementary
and secondary schools as well. With regard to private undergraduate colleges,
the Senator has excluded from covera~e their admissions practices. Does the
same exclusion apply to non public institutions at the elementary and secondary
level?
Mr. BA YH: At the elementary and secondary levels, admissions policies
are not covered. As the Senator knows, we are dealing with three basically
different types of discrimination here. We are dealing with discrimination in
admission to an institution, discrimination of available services or studies
within an institution once students are admitted, and discrimination in employ
ment within an institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever.
In the area of employment, we permit no exceptions. In the area of serv
ices, once a student is accepted within an institution, we permit no exceptions.
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ceptions to title IX as to make no sense if title IX did not cover
employment. 86
In its brief, HEW also asked the court to consider the explana
tion that Senator Bayh offered concerning the scope of his amend
ment. 87 After quoting Senator Bayh's introductory passage, which
said that his amendment would close loopholes in previous legisla
tion related to education and employment, HEW quoted Senator
Bayh further: "Other important provisions in the amendment would
extend the equal employment opportunities provisions of Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to educational institutions, and extend
the Equal Pay for Equal Work Act to include executive, administra
tive and professional women."88 The structure of the passage thus
takes on a two-part organization. The first part, which Judge
Feikens discussed, refers to title IX; while the second portion, quoted
by HEW, refers to the amendments to title VII and the Equal Pay
Act. 89
The Senator from Rhode Island asked about admissions policies of private sec
ondary and primary schools. They would be excepted.
Mr. PELL: That is in the area of non public elementary and secondary
schools.
Mr. BAYH: The Senator is correct. This is one of the exceptions.
Mr. PELL: Mr. President, do I understand the Senator to say that the
faculty of private schools would have to reflect a sexual balance?
Mr. BAYH: This amendment sets no quotas. It only guarantees equality
of opportunity. The Senator from Indiana cannot be sure about the sexual bal
ance many facultx, but as far as employment opportunities are concerned, the
answer would be ·Yes."
Mr. PELL: The Senator means that a private school for girls, for the sake
of argument, would have to accept men teachers, or vice versa?
Mr. BAYH: Someone would have to prove that they did discriminate
against teachers first. The Senator is correct insofar as he is saying that discrim
ination on the basis of sex would be forbidden.
Mr. PELL: Would this apply to a parochial school where they have nuns
as teachers?
Mr. BAYH: No. There is an explicit exception for educational institutions
controlled by a religious organization.
Mr. PELL: Wliat about a boys' prep school? Would there have to be wo
men on the faculty there?
Mr. BAYH: The answer is "Yes." That does not guarantee a balance, as
the Senator knows. However, if discrimination can be proven, the answer is
"Yes."

Mr. PELL: Mr. President, I refer to a preparatory school such as Peekskill
Military Institute which is at the high school level. Would that school be ex
pected to have women teachers?
Mr. BAYH: I am not sure. Is this a military school?
Mr. PELL: It is a military school. However, it is at the high school level.
Mr. BAYH: All military schools are excluded.
Id.

86. 629 F.2d at 782.
87. Brief for Fed. Appellants at 24-25, supra note 26.
88. Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted).
89. The debate conducted in the House of Representatives is not really at issue.
HEW has conceded that the House bill was not intended to cover employment. Reply
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Congressional Committee Reports On Title IX

Both the Senate and the House of Representatives passed edu
cation amendments in 1972. 90 The amendments were different and a
Conference Committee was convened to reconcile the bills. 91 "Title
IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."92
The wording of the basic provision of title VI is virtually the same as
that of title IX. 93 Such an obvious parallel seems to indicate that
Congress intended the two bills to be interpreted similarly.94 During
the congressional debate on title VI, confusion arose as to whether
title VI covered discrimination in employment. 95 To clarify the
scope of title VI, section 604 was added. 96 Section 604 explicitly re
moved employment from the bill's coverage. 97 The House version of
title IX incorporated a section 1004,98 a duplicate of section 604 that
later was deleted by the Conference Committee from the final
version. 99
In Romeo I, Judge Feikens observed the absence of a section in
title IX that paralleled section 604 of title VI. 100 This, he concluded,
was not an indication of an intent to cover employment, but was an
effort to be consistent with the amendments to title VII and the
Brief for Fed. Appellants at 2-4, supra note 70. The House clearly intended to reach
employment through the amendments to title VII or the Equal Pay Act. H.R. REP. No.
554, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS
2462, 2566, (The section in the House bill excluding employment from coverage was
section 1004 of title X.)
90. Senate bill S. 659 passed on March I, 1972. 118 CONGo REC. 6277 (1972).
House bill 7248 passed on June 8, 1972. Id. at 20340.
91. CONF. REP. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. I (1972), reprinted in (1972) U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2608, 2608.
92. Cannon V. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-96 (1979).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). "No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." Id. Compare itl. with 20 U.S.c. § 1681(a) (1976).
94. Caimon V. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979); see Kokoska V.
Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974).
95. 110 CONGo REC. 2484 (1964); id. at 12707; Kuhn, supra note 31, at 53.
96. 110 CONGo REC. 11930 (1964).
97. 42 U.S.c. § 2000d-3 (1976). "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be
construed to authorize action under this subchapter by any department or agency with
respect to any employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor
oganization except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to
provide employment." Id.
98. 118 CONGo REc. 20340 (1972).
99. CONF. REP. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 221 (1972), reprinted in (1972) U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2608, 2671-72.
100. 438 F. Supp. at 1030.
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Equal Pay Act that were parts of the Education Amendments of
1972.101 Support for Judge Feikens' conclusion came from Repre
sentative James O'Hara, who indicated at hearings that section 1004
of the House bill never should have been included, but was carried
over erroneously from a mockup of title VI that had been used in the
drafting process. 102 The Conference Committee, according to Repre
sentative O'Hara, simply corrected the error. 103
In North Haven, the Second Circuit disagreed with this analy
I04
SiS.
The court found no language in the Conference Committee
report, or elsewhere in the legislative history, that indicated the dele
tion was necessary to maintain consistency with title VII and the
Equal Pay Act portions of the amendments. !Os A limited exception,
similar to section 1004, easily could have been drafted to avoid any
inconsistency; 106 thus, the deletion of section 1004 by the Conference
Committee may have indicated disagreement with the section.
D. Post-Enactment Events Impact On Interpretation Of Title IX

Since the enactment of title IX, Congress has been vocal regard
ing its proper interpretation. Post-enactment events first were dis
cussed in Islesboro by the United States District Court· for the
District of Maine. 107 Islesboro held invalid the regulation, under ti
tle IX, of the school board's maternity leave policy. lOS Judge Ed
ward Thaxter Gignoux gave momentary consideration to comments
supporting title IX's coverage of employment that were made during
the hearings of the regulations promulgated by HEW under title
IX.I09 The judge instead focused on congressional failure to disap
prove the regulations. 110 Judge Gignoux interpreted the failure to
101. Id. See also Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th
Cir.), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d
424,428-29 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Kuhn, supra note 31, at 60-61.
102. Sex IJiscrimination Regulations: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Postsecon
dary Educ. of the Comm. on Edue. and Labor-Review ofRegulations to Implement Title
IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 408-09 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Postsecondary Hearings].
103. Id.
104. 629 F.2d at 782-83.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 783. Judge Oakes, writing for the Second Circuit, suggested the follow
ing example: "'Nothing in § 901 shall apply to any employees of any educational insti
tution subject to this title except where a primary objective of the Federal assistance is to
provide employment:" Id. See notes 127-28 infra and accompanying text.
107. 449 F. Supp. at 872-73.
108. Id. at 872.
109. Id.; see Postsecondary Hearings, supra note 102, at 164, 173,201.
110. 449 F. Supp. at 873.
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disapprove in light of Title 20 of the United States Code, section
1232(d)(I),111 which said that failure to disapprove regulations was
not to be deemed approval or a "finding of consistency with the Act
from which it derives its authority. . . ."112 The court concluded
that section 1232(d)(l) vitiates the HEW interpretation of Congress'
.
action. I \3
When the issue came before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in North Haven, the post-enactment events
received further analysis. The Second Circuit initially looked at a
summary of title IX prepared by Dr. Bernice Sandler of the Associa
tion of American Colleges. 114 The summary had been introduced
into the Congressional Record by Senator Bayh. 115 The court
pointed to a footnote in Dr. Sandler's summaryl16 which said, in
part: "Title VI . . . specifically excludes employment from coverage
(except where the primary objective of the federal aid is to provide
employment). There is no similar exemption for employment in the
sex discrimination provisions relating to federally assisted education
programs."117 Senator Bayh, only two months after title IX became
law, apparently felt this was a fair statement of congressional pur
pose, because he introduced the summary into the Congressional
Record. I IS
The Second Circuit also considered Senator Bayh's testimony at
the hearings before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education
of the Committee of Education and Labor. 119 After three years, Sen
ator Bayh still insisted that congressional intent in passing title IX
was to cover employment. 120 The Senator testified that title IX man
dated equality in "admissions, financial aid, course offerings, career
counseling, and in the case of teachers and other educational person
nel, employment, pay and promotions."121
HEW was required to submit to Congress the regulations it
Ill. Id.; see 20 U.S.c. § 1232(d)(1) (1976).
112. 20 U.S.c. § 1232(d)(I) (1976). Bul see 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 25 (1980) (Attorney
General Civiletti suggested that 20 U.S.c. § 1232(d) is unconstitutional as a violation of
the separation of powers.).
113. 449 F. Supp. at 873.
114. 629 F.2d at 782.
115. 118 CONGo REC. 24684 (1972).
116. 629 F.2d at 782.
117. 118 CONGo REC. 24684 n.1 (1972) (emphasis in original).
118. 629 F.2d at 782. Bul see Kuhn, supra note 31, at 56-57.
119. Poslsecondary Hearings, supra note 102, at 173.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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promulgated under title IX. Congress had a forty-five day period
during which it could disapprove any of the regulations by concur
rent resolution. 122 Two resolutions were submitted. The first, by
Senator Jesse Helms, resolved to disapprove all title IX regula
tions.123 The second resolution was submitted by Representatives
Albert Quie and John Erlenbom l24 and recommended Congress dis
approve only subpart E of the regulations. 125 Congress did not ac
cept either of the proposed resolutions. 126
Two amendments to eliminate employment from the scope of
title IX have been introduced in Congress since the hearings on the
regulations. Senator Jesse Helms attempted to limit coverage by an
amendment which said in part: "Nothing in [section 901 of title IX]
shall apply to any employees of any educational institution subject
to this title." 127 This amendment was not adopted. 128 Senator James
McClure tried to limit coverage of title IX to the "curriculum or
graduation requirements of the institutions" receiving federal assist
ance. 129 This proposed amendment also was defeated. l3O

v.

ApPLICABILITY OF REMEDIES IN TITLE

IX

EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION

Following a review of both the language of title IX and its legis
lative history, the courts considered the difficulties and ramifications
of the application of title IX to the problem of sex discrimination in
educational employment. The primary remedy provided by title IX
was the termination of federal assistance to any institution adminis
tratively adjudged to be in violation of the statute and the accompa
nying regulations. 131 Judge Feikens, in Romeo I, considered the
termination of federal funding a drastic remedy132 and believed it
would be arbitrary to terminate funding that was provided for stu
122. 20 U.S.c. § 1232(d)(I) (1976).
123. 121 CONGo REC. 17301 (1975).
124. Hearings on H. Con. Res. 330 Before the Subcomm. on ofthe Comm. on Educ.
and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (A copy is on file with the Committee).
125. Id. The disputed regulations, 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61, are the same as Subpart
E.
126. See 629 F.2d at 784.
127. 121 CONGo REC. 23845-47 (1975).
128. See 629 F.2d at 784.
129. 122 CONGo REC. 28147 (1976).
130. Id.
131. 20 U.s.c. § 1682(1) (1976).
132. 438 F. Supp. at 1032-33. Judge Feikens offered no suggestions as to what less
drastic remedies there might be.
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dents because of discrimination against employees. 133
The Second Circuit dismissed Judge Feikens' argument even
though it "purports to speak both to the heart and to 'common sense'
. . . ."134 Arbitrary action would not be confined to termination of
federal funds because of discrimination against employees, but also
would occur in some cases involving students. If one student was
discriminated against, HEW could terminate funds to the entire
school district. As a result, those students not discriminated against
would be deprived of the benefits of the federal assistance. 135
The remedy provision of title IX also contained a stipulation
that any fund termination "be limited to the particular political en
tity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has
been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular pro
gram, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so
found. . . ."136 Judge Feikens said, "[R]egulation of employment
practices, however, is inherently non-'program specific.' An educa
tional institution's employment policies are general in nature, cover
ing, by and large, all faculty employees involved in all of an
institution's education programs, whether federally funded or
not."137 Application of the fund termination remedy to discrimina
tion in employment would then be impossible because the statute
requires "program specific" application. Judge Feikens concluded
that Congress could not have intended title IX to cover sex discrimi
nation in employment because employment cannot be regulated in a
"program specific" manner.138
The Second Circuit disagreed with Judge Feikens' determina
tion that employment is inherently nonprogram specific within the
meaning of the remedy provision of title IX.139 The court pointed to
the example of admissions and said, "[D]iscrimination in admissions
. . . is clearly prohibited by Title IX regardless of whether the dis
crimination occurs solely in one . . . program or all . . . pro
grams."I40 The objection by Judge Feikens could be applied to
133. Id. at 1032.
134. 629 F.2d at 785.
135. Id.
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
137. 438 F. Supp. at 1033. See Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 1212,
1215 (E.D. Mo. 1978); Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 719, 721-22, 16
Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 8241 at 5245 (W.D. Wash. 1978), affd, 621 F.2d 992 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert. granted, 449 U.S. 1009 (l980).
138. 438 F. Supp. at 1033.
139. 629 F.2d at 785.
140. Id. See also Postsecondary Hearings, supra note 102, at 414.
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admissions programs that Congress clearly intended to be covered.
The objection that employment is nonprogram specific sweeps too
broadly and leads to more inconsistencies than it prevents. Al
though the fund termination remedy presents some problems in its
application, the Second Circuit felt that none of the difficulties were
sufficient to prevent coverage of employment under title IX.141
VI.

SECOND CIRCUIT CONCLUSIONS

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reached three conclusions about title IX and employment. First, the
language of title IX is ambiguous as to whether employment is cov
ered. 142 Second, the legislative history "lends some additional weight
to the view that [section 1681] was expressly intended to relate to
employment practices."143 Finally, no practical or theoretical objec
tions to coverage of employment were sufficient to disrupt the other
two conclusions. l44 Since the question whether title IX covered em
ployment was resolved in the affirmative, a new issue arose. Did
Congress intend title IX to cover all aspects of employment? The
Second Circuit concluded that the regulations issued by HEW under
title IX were valid. 145 This conclusion apparently endorsed all the
regulations on sex discrimination in educational employment
promulgated under title IX by HEW.I46
VII.

ANALYSIS OF TITLE

IX

AND EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT

The analysis and the resolution of whether Congress intended to
reach sex discrimination in educational employment through title IX
cannot be separated from the social and cultural setting of the early
1970's. In 1970 and 1971, the United States population became in
creasingly aware of the inequalities facing women in American soci
ety. For three days in May 1970, the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments conducted hearings on the Equal
Rights Amendment. 147 During that year and the following year,
141. 629 F.2d at 785.
142. Id. at 777-78.
143. Id. at 784.
144. Id. at 784-85. Neither the possible overlapping of jurisdiction between title
VII and the Equal Pay Act with title IX, nor the possible penalties which might accrue to
students, nor the program specific limitation are sufficient to overcome the evidence of
congressional intent to cover employment under title IX. Id.
145. Id. at 786.
146. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61 (1979).
147. See also Hearings on S. Joint Res. 61 BefOre the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Amendments oflhe Senate Comm. on Ihe Judiciary, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess., (1970); Hearings
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three bills that attempted to deal with sex discrimination in educa
tion were introduced in the Congress. 148 Congressional awareness of
the issue was raised, and the milieu for legislative action existed.
Educational systems in American have been a major force in
shaping the consciousness of the population; thus, education was
considered a priority for "equalization."149 Congress learned from
the desegregation efforts of the 1960's that the nation's educational
systems were places of potential conflict in any effort to provide
equal treatment for citizens. The lesson resulted in the use of title
VI,ISO the legal keystone of the desegregation struggle, as a model for
title IX.IS I
The United States Supreme Court defined the congressional
purpose of title IX as seeking to avoid the use of federal resources in
support of discriminatory practices. IS2 If that understanding of the
congressional purpose is combined with a definition of "education"
that includes both the teacher and the pupil,ls3 a realistic conclusion
is that Congress intended to protect all parties to the educational
process from discrimination. The existence of such a reasonable
possibility, however, does not establish such a congressional intent.
A.

Statutory Language Of Title IX

In order to determine the scope that Congress proposed to give
to title IX, the literal meaning of the statute ~ust be interpreted. ls4
The first phrase is "no person."IS5 "No person" is an inclusive term
that encompasses a wide spectrum of individuals. Inclusive lan
guage often is followed by modifications and limitations. The signif
icant modifications in title IX's language are the limitation of the
on S. Joint Res. 61 and S. Joint Res. 231lJej"ore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., (1970).
148. See notes 44-50 supra and accompanying text.
149. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
150. 42 U.S.c. § 2000d (1976).
151. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1970).
152. Id. at 704.
153. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-80 (1979). "[AJ teacher serves as a
role model for his students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their percep
tions and values. Thus, through both the presentation of course materials and the exam
ple he sets, a teacher has an opportunity to inftuence the attitudes of students toward
government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities." Id. at 78-79.
See also Perkins, Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045,
1048 (1968); Philpot, Title IX Sex Discrimination Regulations: Impact on Private Educa
tion, 65 Ky. L.J. 656, 658 (1979).
154. C. SANDS, supra note 43, at 70.
155. 20 U.S.c. § 1681(a) (1976).

1981)

SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT

305

statute to those persons who, on the basis of sex, are "excluded from
participation in, [are] denied the benefits of, or [are] subjected to dis
crimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance. . . ."156
Two of these limitations arguably apply to employees. First, a
teacher who was prevented from performing his or her function be
cause of discrimination would be "excluded from participation in"
the particular program or activity. The mutuality of the educational
process and the indispensible function of the instructor l57 strongly
indicate that his or her exclusion because of discrimination based on
sex would be sufficient to violate title IX. 15S Second, as the Fifth
Circuit suggested in .Dougherty County School System v. Harris,159
"if a female . . . teacher receives less pay than a male . . . teacher
for equal work, she is being 'subject to discrimination under' a pro
gram receiving federal financial assistance."16o Either of these un
derstandings of the limitations of title IX is sufficient to include
employees within the class of persons protected under title IX.
B. Legislative Process Of Title IX
The legislative history of title IX also supports the inclusion of
employees under the title IX protections. It is noteworthy that the
possibility that employment was not covered by title IX, was never
raised during the Senate debate or the comment period on the pre
liminary regulations. 161 The entire issue did not arise until 1975, the
year of the hearings on the regulations. 162
Senator Bayh, in both his introductory comments and his sum
mary of title IX, divided his discussion into two parts. In both in
stances the first part dealt with title IX and the second part dealt with
the amendments to title VII and the Equal Pay Act. He specifically
mentioned employment in both the first and the second portions of
his discussion.
156. Id.
157. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979).
158. Contra Romeo Comm. Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1031 (E.D. Mich.
1977), aJld, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). Judge Feikens said
that teachers participate only to the extent of teaching. Id. Why is that not sufficient?
For example, suppose a male teacher was prevented from teaching in a kindergarten
class because the administration felt that small children needed a maternal figure. He
would be excluded from participation in the educational activity or program.
159. 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980).
160. Id. at 738.
161. Postsecondary Hearings, supra note 102, at 479-80.
162. Id. at 465-68, 477-80. See also 121 CONGo REC. 59714 (1975).
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Senator Bayh introduced his bill and said, "Amendment No.
874 [the number of his bill] is broad, but basically it closes loopholes

in existing legislation relating to general education programs and em
ployment resulting from these programs."163 After additional com
ments in which employment was mentioned further, Senator Bayh
changed his emphasis and referred to "other important provi
sions."I64 It was only after this new subject designator that he men
tioned the amendments to title VII and the Equal Pay ACt. 165
Senator Bayh linked equal employment opportunities for "executive,
administrative and professional women" to these amendments. 166
Senator Bayh's own summary of his bill was divided into four
parts; the first two are relevant here. 167 Part A was entitled, "Prohi
bition Of Sex Discrimination In Federally Funded Education Pro
grams." 168 Under this heading Senator Bayh referred to sections
100 I to 1005 169 of his amendment. 170 He explicitly noted the existing
parallels to parts of title VI, the remedy of fund termination, and the
exemptions he would allow under title IX. J7J He did not mention
title VII or the Equal Pay Act under this heading. 172 The third para
graph of Part A says in part: "This portion of the amendment covers
discrimination in all areas where abuse has been mentioned--em
ployment practices for faculty and administrators, scholarship aid,
admissions, access t9 programs within the institution such as voca
tional education classes, and so forth."173 Conversely, Part B was
headed, "Prohibition Of Education-Related Employment Discrim
ination"174 and, under this heading, Senator Bayh referred to title
VII and the Equal Pay Act but made no mention of any of the provi
sions that were to become title IX. 175 Thus, Part A of Senator Bayh's
summary created an explicit relationship between employment and
163. 118 CONGo REC. 5803 (1972) (emphasis added).
164. Id. See also Brief for Appellant Linda Potz at 19, supra note 17.
165. 118 CONGo REC. 5803 (1972).
166. Id.
167. Parts C and D dealt with "Studies Of Sex Discrimination" and "Suits by the
Attorney General" respectively. Id. at 5807-08.
168. Id. at 5807.
169. Section 1005 does not appear to fit under this heading and its inclusion ap
pears inadvertant. Id. See 629 F.2d at 781 n.ll.
170. 118 CONGo REC. 5807 (1972).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 5812.
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those sections of his bill that became title IX. Part B related employ
ment to title VII and the Equal Pay Act.
Senator Bayh's introduction and summary had the same divi
sion between title IX and the amendments to title VII and the Equal
Pay Act and, in both instances, he explicitly mentioned employment
in relation to each portion. For such a division to occur once might
be deemed inadvertant, but for it to occur twice raises the reasonable
inference that Senator Bayh, the proponent of the amendment, in
tended to include sex discrimination in educational employment
under title IX as well as under title VII and the Equal Pay Act.
The third relevant portion of the debate is the dialogue between
Senators Bayh and Pell. Senator Pell began the dialogue by asking
specifically about sections 1001(a) and (b), which became sections
1681(a) and (c) of Title 20 of the United States Code. 176 Senator
Pell's question related to the exclusion of admissions policies of pri
vate undergraduate colleges from coverage and whether the exclu
sion applied to "nonpublic institutions at the elementary and
secondary level. ..."177 In response, Senator Bayh said, "[W]e are
dealing with discrimination in admission to an institution, discrimi
nation of available services or studies within an institution once stu
dents are admitted, and discrimination in employment within an
institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever. In the area of
employment, we permit no exceptions." 178
Senator Pell followed with a series of questions. 179 Each ques
tion linked an element of title IX with an employment practice. In
essence he asked: Does a private school have to have a faculty made
up equally of men and women? May a parochial school use only
nuns as teachers? Must a military school for boys have female
faculty members?180 The Second Circuit correctly concluded that
the questions posed by Senator Pell made no sense if both he and
Senator Bayh did not think that employment was covered by title
IX.181 The intent to include sex discrimination in educational em
ployment under title IX is buttressed when the exchange between
Senators Bayh and Pell is considered in light of the statements of
Senator Bayh, who twice linked title IX and employment. 182
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 5812-13.
Id.
Id.
629 F.2d at 782.
See text accompanying notes 163-75 supra.
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The passage of similar bills by the House of Representatives
and the Senate made it necessary for the matter to go to a Confer
ence Committee where any differences would be reconciled. The
Conference Committee made only one important change in the bills:
It dropped section 1004 of the House bill, an explicit exclusion of
employment from coverage. 183 The deletion of section 1004 was ex
plained by Representative O'Hara as the correction of a drafting er
ror. 184
He contended that the exemption in section 1004
contradicted the amendments to title VII and the Equal Pay Act that
were part of the bill. 18s This is the kind of ex post facto explanation
by a member of Congress, however, that traditionally has been given
little weight by the courts when there is no corroborative evidence in
the legislative record. 186 The ease with which Congress could have
limited the section exempting employment to only title IX,187 or the
ease with which the main provision could have been applied explic
itly to students only,188 undermines the view of Mr. O'Hara. The
testimony of Senator Bayh at the postsecondary hearings indicated
that title IX covered employment, and no reference was made to any
error involving section 1004 of the House bill. 189
Another indication that title IX was intended to include em
ployment was Congress' failure to either disapprove of the regula
tions or amend title IX to exclude employment. Representatives
Quie and Erlenbom introduced an amendment to a concurrent reso
lution to disapprove the HEW regulations relating to sex discrimina
tion in educational employment. 190 This resolution was not reported
out by the Education and Labor Committee.l9l Also, amendments
introduced by Senators Helms l92 and McCIure l93 that would have
183. CONF. REP. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 221 (1972) reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2608, 2671-72.
184. Postsecondary Hearings, supra note 102, at 408-09.
185. Id.
186. Rogers V. Frito-Lay, 611 F.2d 1074, 1080 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 686 n.7 (1970). The weight which the Supreme
Court the comments of senators and representatives after the passage of title IX about a
private right of action does not apply to Representative O'Hara's comments. His com
ments were not on the floor nor were they made in relation to any legislation which was
adopted. Id. See also 611 F.2d at 1081.
187. 629 F.2d at 783.
188. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 76, § 5 (Law. Co-op 1978) (amended in 1971 to
prohibit discrimination in education based on sex).
189. Postsecondary Hearings, supra note 102, at 164. See also id. at 173,201.
190. 629 F.2d at 783.
191. See id. at 784.
192. 121 CONGo REC. 23845-47 (1975).
193. 122 CONGo REc. 28136-37 (1976). Senator Bayh opposed Senator McClure's

1981)

SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT

309

altered title IX radically were not adopted. 194 If title IX was not
intended to cover employment, Congress had sufficient opportunity
to amend it or alter the regulations; but did not do so.
C. Remedy Provisions Of Title IX And Employment
The North Haven and Trumbull school boards argued that if
title IX were construed as covering employment, two inconsistencies
would be created between the main portion of the statute and the
remedy provision. 19s The first conflict allegedly would exist between
the program specific fund termination remedy a~d the "inherent,"
nonprogram specific nature of employment. 196 Title IX mandates
that if funds are terminated because of discrimination, the funds
must be terminated only to the specific program in which the dis
crimination has occurred. 197 The school boards contended that em
ployment does not relate to specific programs and therefore the fund
termination remedy could not be applied as the statute requires. 198
The argument that program specific fund termination is incon
sistent with the inherently nonprogram nature of employment may
be applied equally to other areas that undisputedly are covered by
title IX. The Second Circuit has noted that the difficulty of applica
tion could be raised against the fund termination remedy in gen
era1. 199
"For instance, discrimination in admissions to an
institution's graduate schools is clearly prohibited by Title IX re
gardless of whether the discrimination occurs solely in one graduate
program or all graduate programs. "200 The argument, therefore, of
fers no logical reason why Congress would not have intended title IX
to reach sex discrimination in educational employment. 201
The school boards also advanced a second argument recognized
by the Second Circuit as speaking "both to the heart and to 'common
amendment and commented on its enormous impact on title IX specifically pointing to
employment. Id. at 28144.
.
194. 121 CONGo REC. 23847 (1975) (amendment of Senator Helms); 122 CONGo
REC. 28147 (1976) (amendment of Senator McClure).
195. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 34-37, supra note 14.
196. Id.; 438 F. Supp. at 1033.
197. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
198. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 34-37, supra note 14.
199. 629 F.2d at 785.
200. Id.
201. A factual question might arise as to whether the difficulty in terminating the
funds of a particular program was created by the educational system itself. If the internal
distribution of the federal funds in question was determined by the school board, it
hardly would be equitable to allow the board to perpetuate discrimination by asserting
that non tainted programs would be injured.
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sense.' "202 The argument suggested that Congress could not have
intended to deprive students of the benefit of federal money based
upon discrimination against teachers.203 The argument, however,
encounters two difficulties. First, as the Second Circuit noted, the
same unfairness would occur if funds were terminated because one
student was discriminated against. 204 The termination of funds
would cause the remaining students to suffer. 205 The sweep of the
argument is too expansive.
Second, the argument rests on a mistaken premise. The school
boards contended that "[t]he principal (indeed the only) enforcement
method specifically mentioned is fund termination."206 Although
that is true, the argument requires that the remedy of fund termina
tion be either the only remedy or be an arbitrarily utilized remedy.
Title IX, however, does provide for other remedies when it says en
forcement may be effected "by any other means authorized by
law... ."207 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,208 the United
States Supreme Court recognized fund termination to be a drastic
remedy and declared it inappropriate if only "an isolated violation
has occurred."209 The Court specifically noted the priority of reme
dies in title IX: "Congress itself has noted the severity of the fund
cutoff remedy and has described it as a last resort all else-including
'lawsuits'-failing."210 Thus in the case of a single teacher who was
discriminated against, HEW could seek a court order for reinstate
ment, back pay, an injunction, or other appropriate remedy. The
ultimate threat of fund termination would be held in reserve to be
used against recalcitrant offenders.
Safeguards also exist against arbitrary utilization of title IX.
Any remedy imposed on an educational institution under HEW reg
ulations must proceed through the established administrative pro
202. 629 F.2d at 785.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Brief for PlaintiffS-Appellees at 34, supra note 14. Judge Feikens clearly mis
construed the thrust of section 1682 when he said, "(TJhe only sanction permitted under
section 1682 is a termination of federal funds to the noncomplying institution." 438 F.
Supp. at 1032 (emphasis added). See also Brief for Appellant Linda Potz at 23, supra
note 17.
207. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
208. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
209. Id. at 705.
210. Id. at 705 n.38. See also United States v. Frazer, 297 F. Supp. 319, 322 (M.D.
Ala. 1968).
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cess211 and is subject to judicial review. 212 In the final instance,
Congress can intervene by amending the statute if it determines that
the agency has overreached its authority.213
D. Regulatory Scope Of Title IX

The analysis of the language, the internal structure, the legisla
tive history, and the post-enactment events relating to title IX point
conclusively to Congress' intent to cover sex discrimination in educa
tional employment under title IX. A further issue, however, re
mains: What is the scope to be given to title IX in the area of
employment? In this context, "scope" has two components. First,
title IX only applies to "programs or activities" that receive federal
funds. 214 How narrowly are the terms "programs" .:>r "activities" to
be interpreted? HEW has interpreted "program" so broadly that it
can encompass the entire educational institution. 2ls Thus, if one
dollar of federal money goes to an institution, all facets of the insti
tution are subject to title IX. The institutions, conversely, have in
sisted that "program" refers to a limited element of the institution's
life, that the particular element must be a recipient of federal assist
ance, and that the element must be proven to have been adminis
tered in a discriminatory manner.216
In North Haven, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec
ond Circuit dealt with the program specific issue by concluding that
the program specific requirement applied to the implementation of
the fund termination remedy and not to HEW's authority to issue
regulations. 217 The court, in dicta, said that broad regulations cover
ing all aspects of employment can be promulgated; but, if HEW
seeks fund termination, a specific program that receives federal
funds must be designated as discriminatory.2ls Federal assistance to
an entire system can be terminated only if the discrimination perme
ates the entire system. 219 This analysis rested on United States v. Jef
ferson County Board ofEducation,220 in which a broad interpretation
211. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976).
212. 20 U.S.c. § 1683 (1976). But see 600 F.2d at 584.
213. For example. consider the exceptions that Congress has added since the pas
sage of title IX. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(6)-(9).
214. Id. § 1681 (1976).
215. See Brief for Fed. Appellants at 41-45, supra note 26.
216. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 34-37, supra note 14.
217. 629 F.2d at 785-86.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. 372 F.2d 836, 847-61 (1966).
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was given to identical language in title VI.221 The same point was
made regarding the "pinpoint" provision of title VI in Flanagan v.
President and Directors of Georgetown College,222 in which the use of
federal funds in the construction of the Law Center was held suffi
cient to bring all the institution's programs under title VI.223 The
court said, "This provision (Title 42 of the United States Code, Sec
tion 2000d-l) of course is directed towards the efforts of federal
agencies in eff"ecting compliance with Title VI and is not a restriction
on the types of discrimination outlawed by the statute."224 The stat
utory structure of title IX lends support to this conclusion. The pro
gram specific language appears in the section dealing with remedies
and not the section authorizing HEW to promulgate the
regulations. 225
The second aspect of the scope problem raises the question
whether all employment practices can be regulated under title IX.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Dough
erry, hinted that some aspects of employment might be covered, but
the court offered no real clues as to how any division should be
made. 226 The sole example the court used, the disparity in pay be
tween a male teacher and a female teacher performing equivalent
work and paid with federal funds, is not particularly helpful.227 The
best solution is to step back and consider the policies underlying title
IX. The general policy is to prevent the use of federal resources to
support discriminatory practices. 228 A more specific policy is to pre
vent the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices
in education. If education is the focus, then the employment prac
tices that Congress intended to reach through title IX ought to be
those practices that impinge on the educational process. For exam
ple, consider the facts as presented in the cases joined in North Ha
ven. The North Haven branch involved the maternity leave policies
of the school system. 229 Whether the maternity leave policies of the
school system were discriminatory was a serious issue, but it did not
impinge on or have a nexus with the educational process in a way
that reduced the quality of that process. On the other hand, the issue
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

See 42 U.S.c. § 2000d-l (1976).
417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976).
Id. at 385.
Id. at 383 (emphasis added).
20 U.S.c. § 1682 (1976).
622 F.2d at 738.
Id.
441 U.S. at 704.
629 F.2d at 775.
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in the Trumbull branch allegedly involved procedures that
demeaned and eventually resulted in the termination of the only fe
male counselor at the junior high school level in the school sys
tem. 230 The lack of any female counselors to respond to questions
from the female students in an adolescent school population effec
tively denied those students many benefits of that program. The al
leged sexual discrimination against Ms. Potz impinged upon the
access to the counseling program of all students at the junior high
school level in the Trumbull school system. The residual effect of
such a deprivation on the educational process as a whole would be a
question of fact, but could be hypothesized as effecting classroom
behavior, socialization, course selection, and career choices. If such
impairments could be proven, title IX ought to protect the educa
tional process and provide relief to Ms. Potz. Such relief might be
any appropriate remedy, including fund termination, if the school
board was recalcitrant. 231
The proposed pattern of analysis would permit HEW to investi
gate complaints on the basis of broadly drawn regulations. The spe
cific facts of each case would be measured against strictly construed
elements when trying to prove a particular title IX violation. 232
There are four elements that HEW or the private plaintiff would
have to prove. First, a sexually discriminatory employment practice
would have to be shown to exist. Second, the discriminatory practice
would have to be linked to the educational process. 233 Third, a pro
gram or activity receiving federal assistance would have to be shown
to be discriminatory.234 Finally, the appropriate remedy would have
to be selected. The appropriate remedy, of course, must be the least
intrusive means toward eliminating the discrimination. 235
Such an application of title IX would fulfill the policy of
preventing the use of federal funds to support discriminatory actions.
Simultaneously, the educational institutions would be assured of a
fair remedy for isolated violations, while HEW would retain the
fund termination remedy for recalcitrant defendants.
230. /d.; Brief for Appellant Linda Potz at 25-32, supra note 17.
231. See text accompanying notes 206-13 supra.
232. A similar pattern has developed in suits brought under the Securities Act of
1934, IS U.S.c. § 78j (1976). See generally Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cerro denied,404
U.S. 1005 (1971).
233. See notes 226-32 supra and accompanying text.
234. See notes 214-25 supra and accompanying text.
235. See notes 209-13 supra and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

In North Haven Board of Education v. Hufttedler,236 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit validated regulations
issued by HEW that included sex discrimination in educational em
ployment under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. 237
North Haven is contrary to the decisions of fourteen other federal
courts that have invalidated the same regulations. North Haven is
ripe for consideration by the United States Supreme Court.
The Second Circuit, in its attempt to construe congressional in
tent, found the language of title IX ambiguous regarding the statute's
coverage of sex-based, employment discrimination. 238 The main
support for interpreting title IX as covering employment discrimina
tion was found in the legislative history and the subsequent failure
by Congress to exclude employment from coverage. 239 The court
specifically noted the deletion of an explicit exclusion of employ
ment from the House version of title IX by the Conference Commit
tee. 240 In dicta, the court discussed the remedies available under title
IX and decided that the main remedy, termination of federal assist
ance to the discriminating institution, was drastic but not so extreme
that Congress could not have intended it to be applied in employ
ment cases. 241
The conclusion that employment can be regulated under title IX
does not end the inquiry. The issue of the scope of title IX within the
area of employment remains. The scope issue has two components.
First, as title IX only applies to programs or activities receiving fed
eral funds, how broadly are the words program and activity to be
interpreted? The Second Circuit correctly interpreted the intention
of Congress to restrict the application of the remedies to specific
programs or activities that receive federal assistance and not to re
strict the ability of HEW to regulate potential instances of sex dis
crimination in education.242 The second question regarding the
scope of title IX is whether all employment practices are covered. In
light of the title IX policy to prevent the use of federal resources to
support discriminatory practices in education, it is logical that the
236. 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ.
v. Bell, 450 U.S. 909 (1981) (cases joined for decision).
237. Id. at 786.
238. See notes 27-32 supra and accompanying text.
239. See notes 44-88 & 128-31 supra and accompanying text.
240. See notes 89-106 supra and· accompanying text.
241. See notes 132-41 supra and accompanying text.
242. 629 F.2d at 785.
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employment practices covered be those that have a nexus with the
educational process.
If liability under title IX is established, there remains the selec
tion of an appropriate remedy. Title IX allows HEW or the court to
tailor the remedy to fit the severity of the discrimination. All the
usual legal remedies are available but, in the case of a recalcitrant
school board, the federal funds may be terminated.
Title IX authorizes HEW to regulate sex discrimination in edu
cational employment. The broad regulations promulgated by HEW
are within the scope of title IX. In any particular case, however, the
plainti.ff has to establish that a sexually discriminatory employment
practice exists, that the practice is linked to the educational process,
that the program or activity affected receives federal assistance, and
that an appropriate remedy exists before he or she can prevail under
title IX.243
Car! T. Holt

243. See notes 235-36 supra and accompanying text.

